Carbon arbitrage and the migration of climate risk into global debt markets

Roy, Anasruta
Journal of Banking Regulation · Springer Nature · 2026-10-21 · DOI: 10.1057/s41261-026-00369-3

Аннотация

Ten years of climate finance governance have not prevented more than USD 1 trillion of global investment from flowing into fossil fuels each year, much of it originated, underwritten or booked by regulated banks and shadow-banking entities operating alongside them. This paper contends that the endurance of brown investment is not a result of the misapplication of regulation but an unintended consequence of the structure of the regulation itself. Key instruments of climate financial governance leave the debt instruments on which most carbon-intensive finance relies, including syndicated bank loans and the private credit funds that increasingly compete with banks for leveraged lending, well outside their reach. This paper identifies architecture as the source of what it calls “carbon financial arbitrage”, which is a systematic, decentralised shift of brown financing into less-regulated debt markets and jurisdictions, with direct consequences for bank balance-sheet exposure, prudential supervision, and the perimeter of macroprudential monitoring. It details the mechanism across four phases and reports an aggregate-level event study of ESG-labelled bond issuance around key regulatory effective dates as a preliminary empirical check on the argument, examines the distributive effects on the financial systems of Emerging Markets and Developing Economies. This paper ultimately argues that regulating finance to align it with the Paris Agreement means extending regulation across the entire capital structure of fossil fuel investment, not just its public equity segment, and that banking regulators in particular cannot treat the resulting risk migration as someone else’s perimeter problem.

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