Journal of Cryptographic Engineering Computer Networks and Communications
Clone-device-less high-order template attacks on QC-MDPC
Abstract
Post-Quantum Cryptosystems based on Quasi-Cyclic Moderate Density Parity Check (QC-MDPC) codes (e.g., BIKE) are efficient but vulnerable to side-channel leakage from Hamming weight computations. Our clone-device-less template attack combines centered-product preprocessing, semi-supervised CSCAE representation learning, and latent-code classification. We introduce a theoretical model that quantifies trace complexity under varying levels of discrimination to support key recovery analysis and then validate end-to-end key recovery for first-order masked BIKE with valid and invalid ciphertexts and use these data to estimate higher-order requirements. For third-order masking, the model estimates 4.14 million total traces when invalid ciphertexts are permitted and 10.98 million total traces in the valid-ciphertext setting; both totals include 80,000 model-construction traces, comprising 60,000 labeled profiling traces and 20,000 unlabeled adaptation traces. The resulting framework connects high-order leakage classification to GJS key recovery without a separate profiling device.