International Journal of Game Theory Социальные науки (прочее)

Hotelling bound: pricing and location with reservation prices

Heinsalu, Sander, Tombak, Mihkel, Virag, Gabor
Springer Nature · 2026-08-20 · DOI 10.1007/s00182-026-01009-w

Аннотация

We study a Hotelling-type model with income constrained consumers, deriving closed-form subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) locations and prices as functions of income levels and transportation costs. For most income levels, a unique symmetric equilibrium exists. When reservation prices are binding, SPE yields intermediate differentiation and lower prices, boosting consumer surplus. However, under severe income constraints, firms leave part of the market uncovered and behave like local monopolists. Further income reductions reduce consumer surplus. Thus, firms improve the welfare of lower- income consumers under moderate reservation price constraints but worsen it under extreme income restrictions.

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