Environmental Economics and Policy Studies Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

Green transition and welfare in a differentiated duopoly

Correani, Luca, Morganti, Patrizio, Ceccarelli, Valentina
Springer Nature · 2026-10-01 · DOI 10.1007/s10018-026-00480-9

Abstract

This paper contributes to the industrial-organization literature on the green transition by examining price competition and welfare in a vertically differentiated duopoly where environmental performance is a quality attribute. Going green may mean cleaner production or higher environmental quality by design. The green variant carries a higher marginal cost, while consumers value environmental quality and may suffer social or psychological disutility from consuming the brown variant. We show the transition can produce asymmetric configurations where only one firm goes green, persisting even under strong social pressure against brown consumption. We compare consumer surplus and total welfare across market configurations. A fully green market improves welfare when the green variant’s quality advantage sufficiently outweighs its cost disadvantage. In mixed configurations, requiring the remaining brown firm to go green can raise welfare by removing the psychological burden of brown consumption – gains that grow when this burden is substantial and the added production cost is limited. Transition policies should thus be assessed not only for their environmental effects, but also for how the resulting degree of differentiation reshapes equilibrium prices and markups.

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