Consider an alternative: mitigating anchoring effects in professional judges’ sentencing decisions

Berthet, Vincent, Goldszlagier, Julien, Catelan, Nicolas, Thierry, Jean-Baptiste, Gardelle, Vincent
Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications · Springer Nature · 2026-11-14 · DOI: 10.1186/s41235-026-00772-4

Abstract

We investigate the impact of a cognitive intervention on the anchoring effect in the context of criminal justice, where public prosecutors’ sentencing recommendations influence judicial decisions. We predicted that prompting judges to engage in more deliberative thinking about the prosecutor’s demand would reduce its influence on sentencing decisions. We conducted an experiment on French professional judges ( N = 139) where they evaluated a criminal case in which the prosecutor’s sentencing demands served as anchors. As expected, we found judges exhibited an anchoring effect: they pronounced more severe sentences after high (vs. low) demands from the prosecutor. The cognitive intervention consisted in asking judges to consider an alternative, that is, to generate arguments supporting both the proposed sentence and an opposite (lower or higher) sentence. This intervention substantially reduced the anchoring effect. These findings suggest that judges may rely on the prosecutor’s demands when making sentencing decisions but can be prompted to engage in more deliberative processing. Although these findings should be considered exploratory given the use of a single vignette and the incomplete randomization of experimental conditions across sessions, they suggest that prompting judges to consider alternative sentencing arguments may help reduce the influence of anchoring on judicial decisions. Such simple, effective procedural safeguards may help courts promote fair sentencing. Judges must often translate complex case information into a single number, such as a prison sentence or a damages award. Research shows that this kind of judgment is vulnerable to anchoring: an initial value, such as the punishment requested by a prosecutor, can pull the judge’s final decision toward it, even when that value is arbitrary or only partially relevant. Because sentencing affects defendants’ lives and is meant to be impartial, reducing this bias is an important real-world problem, not a theoretical curiosity. We tested whether a simple intervention, asking judges to generate one reason for a lower sentence and one reason for a higher sentence before deciding, could reduce their reliance on the prosecutor’s demand. In an experiment with 139 French professional judges, we replicated the anchoring effect: judges who saw a higher demand handed down markedly longer sentences than those who saw a lower demand. When judges first considered arguments on both sides, however, this gap shrank substantially. This shows that experienced professionals remain susceptible to a basic cognitive bias, but that a brief, low-cost prompt for deliberation can curb its influence. These findings have practical implications: courts could incorporate simple consider-the-alternative procedures into sentencing practice as a safeguard against undue anchoring, without extensive retraining or changes to legal procedures. More broadly, the study shows how basic principles of judgment and decision-making, first identified in laboratory studies with lay participants, can be tested and applied to improve high-stakes professional decisions with real consequences for fairness and justice.

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