Dynamic Games and Applications Computational Mathematics
Three-Gambler Ruin Game: A Game Theoretic Analysis
Abstract
Abstract We study the following game. Three players start with initial capitals of $$s_{1},s_{2},s_{3}$$ s 1 , s 2 , s 3 dollars; in each round player $$P_{m}$$ P m is selected with probability $$\frac{1}{3}$$ 1 3 ; then he selects player $$P_{n}$$ P n and they play a game in which $$P_{m}$$ P m wins from (resp. loses to) $$P_{n}$$ P n one dollar with probability $$p_{mn}$$ p mn (resp. $$p_{nm}=1-p_{mn}$$ p nm = 1 - p mn ). When a player loses all his capital he drops out; the game continues until a single player wins by collecting everybody’s money. This is a “strategic” version of the classical Gambler’s Ruin game. It seems reasonable that a player may improve his winning probability by judicious selection of which opponent to engage in each round. We formulate the situation as a stochastic game and prove that it has at least one Nash equilibrium in stationary deterministic strategies.